Although a great deal of research examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the state legislature, the consequences for the state executive branch have been largely ignored. The voter initiative process provides the governor with a method to circumvent the legislature, which may increase the power of the governor in theory. However, it also provides citizens with a means to bypass the traditional lawmaking process and avoid the governor's veto. This may reduce the power of the governor and lead to policies farther from the preferences of the governor. This study examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the power of the state governor by estimating total election cycle spending. Campaign expenditures are expected to reflect any sustained gain or loss in power due to the availability of the voter initiative process. The results indicate that gubernatorial campaign expenditures are significantly lower in states in which the voter initiative process is available. This finding suggests that state governors sustain a loss in political power when the voter initiative is available. Additionally, the findings imply that individuals may employ the voter initiative process as a substitute for gubernatorial support.
The Voter Initiative and the Power of the Governor: Evidence from Campaign Expenditures 1 Introduction
The resurgence of the use of the voter initiative process in the U.S. at the state level in the past few decades has resulted in renewed interest in voter initiative research. A significant proportion of the literature has been devoted to the debate concerning the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative process. The focus of the debate centers largely on whether special interest groups or the median voter benefit most from the availability of the voter initiative. While the state legislature is generally considered to relinquish decision making authority when the voter initiative is available, there has been little investigation into the impact of the voter initiative process on the state executive branch. Matsusaka (2008) explores the effects of the voter initiative on the relative policy influence of the median voter, legislative branch, and executive branch in states in the U.S. He uses a simple model that employs singlepeaked preferences to examine policy outcomes. The voter initiative process provides an additional avenue by which constituents and other interested parties can influence policy. The model shows that the legislative branch does cede decision making authority to voters when the voter initiative process is available. However, the impact of the voter initiative process on the executive branch is less clear. Although the voter initiative affords the governor the opportunity to bypass the legislature and propose laws through a direct vote, it also allows the general public to propose laws that can avoid the governor's veto. While the voter initiative process is a clear substitute for the legislature and weakens the political power of state legislators, the impact of the voter initiative on the relative political power of the governor and the extent to which the voter initiative process serves as a substitute for gubernatorial support is uncertain.
The empirical literature indicates that campaign spending is higher for offices with more power, suggesting that we can employ the amount of campaign spending as a proxy for the power of office.
1 , Crain, Tollison, Deaton, and Tollison (1977) and Gifford and Santoni (1978) find that campaign funding increases as the size of the public resources controlled increases. Additionally, Abrams (1981) shows that other measures of the ability to influence policy such as the power to appoint officials and finance with debt increase campaign 1 In addition to political influence and political resources, the ambitions of the individual politician may also impact campaign expenditures (Schlesinger, 1966) . Therefore, a candidate and his donors may spend money on a campaign in order to continue climbing the political ladder. However, research has shown that political influence and resources have significant effects on campaign expenditures.
spending. Lott (2000) finds that increasing public budgets are the primary cause of increasing campaign expenditures. Furthermore, candidates receive greater campaign contributions when budgets are larger according to Palda (1992) . Finally, Artés and Viñuela (2007) find that greater appointment power leads to higher campaign expenditures. While many factors influence campaign spending, it is expected that candidates and their campaign contributors will spend more money to gain election to a position that provides a stronger influence over policy other things constant. If the availability of the voter initiative process alters the power of a political position, campaign expenditures should reflect the sustained gain or loss of political power accordingly.
This paper evaluates the effect of the voter initiative process on the political power of the executive branch by examining campaign expenditures in state gubernatorial elections. A higher level of campaign spending in voter initiative states would suggest that the voter initiative process enhances the political power of the state governor while lower campaign spending would imply that the political power of the state governor is weakened by the voter initiative process. Total election cycle spending is estimated for candidates for state gubernatorial seats. The analysis finds that campaign spending in gubernatorial contests is significantly lower in voter initiative states. These results suggest that the voter initiative process reduces the political power of the state governor.
Section 2 outlines the theory behind the impact of the voter initiative process on the executive branch while section 3 discusses the empirical specification for the estimation of state gubernatorial campaign expenditures.
Section 4 examines the results, discusses the implications of the findings, and examines spending in federal Senate elections to check for unobserved state specific variables that may influence campaign expenditures. The final section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.
The Effect of the Voter Initiative on Relative Influence
The voter initiative is a form of direct democracy that allows groups and individual voters to propose statutes or constitutional amendments. Individuals can place laws or amendments on the ballot in states where the voter initiative is available, allowing voters to directly decide the outcome. In order to place a voter initiative on the ballot, a certain number of signatures must be collected to provide evidence of sufficient support for the measure. The signature requirement varies across states in which the voter initiative is available. Once the signature requirement is met, the policy proposal will appear on the ballot. The proposal is adopted if a majority of voters vote in favor of the proposal. Table 1 .
[ Table 1 ]
Much of the existing voter initiative literature has examined the beneficiaries of the voter initiative process and the corresponding loss of policy influence sustained by the legislature. Since the voter initiative allows voters to break the monopoly that the legislature holds on the creation of laws, it seems obvious that the legislature will in fact lose power relative to the voters when the voter initiative is available. However, the vast majority of the literature has yet to examine the impact of the voter initiative process on the role of the executive branch in law making.
In order to enact a new law in a state that does not have the voter initiative process, a bill must be introduced in the state House or Senate. After deliberation between the introduction and passage of a bill, numerous amendments may occur throughout the process. Once a bill is passed by both chambers, it then must be signed into law by the state governor. The governor may veto the bill, although the state legislature may be able to override the veto. The legislature and the governor are the two parties directly involved in the policymaking process in states that lack the voter initiative process. However, individuals and other interested parties can directly propose policy changes and bypass the traditional policy making process in voter initiative states. The availability of the voter initiative process can potentially alter the policymaking dynamic. Matsusaka (2008) provides the first attempt to examine the effects of the voter initiative on the relative influence of the median voter, the legislature, and the executive branch. He uses a simple model similar to Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) in which all actors have single-peaked preferences. The median voter's ideal policy preference (V), the legislature's ideal policy preferences (L), and the governor's ideal policy preference (G) are points along the real line. The policy (x) is a point on the real line. A game between the three participants determines the equilibrium policy (x*) along the real line.
This model follows typical convention and ignores the idea that voters play a role in the law making process by electing their government officials. 2 When this is the case, the median voter and the governor are excluded from the law making process in the absence of the voter initiative. In this case, the legislature is able to select their ideal policy preference (x* = L).
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[ Figure 1 ] However, the median voter and the governor can directly affect a policy decision when the voter initiative is available. While there are several different scenarios and preference orders that may be considered, the evaluation of two potential situations displays the possible effects of the voter initiative on the relative influence of the three players. One possible situation is displayed in Figure 1 (a). In this case, L < V < G. The availability of the voter initiative in this situation allows the voters or the governor to propose a policy that is better aligned with their preferences. If the status quo has been determined by the legislature (x* = L), the voters will favor a voter initiative placing the policy closer to their true preference. This policy could be proposed by either the voters or the governor.
The measure would be approved by voters if the voter initiative was placed on the ballot. Additionally, the legislature might preemptively enact legislation that voters prefer in order to avoid a voter initiative that could push policy farther from the preferences of the legislature. 4 When the situation in Figure 1 (a) exists, both voters and the governor stand to gain when the voter initiative process is available while the legislature loses decision making authority. Any policy that prevails can benefit the voter and the governor. At the very least, the voter initiative cannot harm either the voter or the governor in this situation. Once more, the availability of the voter initiative allows the voter the opportunity to choose a more ideal policy.
Assuming that the status quo policy is determined by the legislature (x* = L), voters will prefer a policy further to the left. Once again, the proposition of a voter initiative may lead to preemptive action by the legislature. If the voter initiative were to be placed on the ballot, voters would approve of the measure. However, in this situation, the new policy is farther from the preferred policy of the governor. Additionally, policies that are approved through voter initiatives are exempt from the governor's veto. While the legislature again loses influence to the voter in Figure 1 (b), the governor can also be harmed by the policy resulting from the voter initiative process. Finally, the voter should benefit from this situation and cannot be harmed at the very least.
According to this basic model, the voters are the one party that cannot be harmed by the presence of the voter initiative. The legislature cannot gain influence with the availability of the voter initiative process because they would have a monopoly on the production of legislation otherwise. The effect of the voter initiative on the executive branch remains rather ambiguous. The voter initiative can lead to a more favorable outcome for the governor when the policy preferences of the median voter are more aligned with the governor's preferences than the preferences of the legislature, e.g. Figure 1 (a). However, the voter initiative can lead to outcomes that are unfavorable to the governor when the preferences of the median voter are more aligned with those of the legislature, e.g. Figure 1 (b).
Also, constituents and other parties can turn to the voter initiative process to accomplish political objectives instead of offering support for gubernatorial candidates.
While theory and observation can guide our analysis of the effects of the voter initiative on the relative power of the median voter, the legislature, and the governor, the question has yet to be investigated empirically. This paper examines this issue by estimating total election cycle spending by candidates for state gubernatorial offices.
This affords the opportunity to examine the effects of the voter initiative on the value of a political seat through the eyes of candidates and their donors. If the availability of the voter initiative increases the influence of state governors, we would expect to find that candidates in voter initiative states spend more in election campaigns after controlling for other factors. However, the voter initiative process provides an alternative method by which constituents and other interested parties can accomplish political objectives. We would expect lower expenditures if individuals turn to the voter initiative process to accomplish political goals and the governor surrenders political power.
State Gubernatorial Election Cycle Spending
As mentioned previously, the voter initiative has an ambiguous effect on the power of the executive branch. Total per capita election cycle gubernatorial expenditures are estimated in order to examine the issue following a model of campaign expenditure estimates from Lott, Jr. (2000) . 6 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable are reported in Table 2 . The average per capita election cycle expenditures for gubernatorial elections in all states is $2.68 (year 2000 dollars). Average expenditures are $2.28 in voter initiative states compared to $2.94 in states that lack the voter initiative process. The study accounts for a number of state specific and election specific factors in order to determine campaign spending. Gubernatorial campaign spending on a per capita basis is examined to control for state population within the dependent variable. Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) and Hogan and Hamm (1998) note that population is in fact one of the most important explanatory factors in campaign spending.
[ Table 2 ]
Per capita state expenditures are the most important determinant of campaign spending according to Lott, Jr. (2000) . He argues that this is due to the fact that state expenditures are the resources that candidates are vying to control. Per capita income and population are also included as independent variables. Lott, Jr. (2000) suggests that per capita income can control for changes in the desire and ability of constituents to contribute to campaigns while population controls for the scale effects of campaigning. A dummy variable is included to account for states that have split control of the state legislature. Contributors may be less willing to donate when the state legislature is dominated by opposite parties as Rogers (2005) finds that split control of the legislature at the state level decreases legislative production.
6 While candidates and their donors may spend money to gain election to a political office in order to progress toward more desirable political positions, other variables concerning political influence and political resources have significant explanatory power concerning campaign spending. The impact of the voter initiative process on gubernatorial campaign expenditures is significant in this study even though some candidates may simply aspire to greater political positions.
Governors in different states experience differing degrees of gubernatorial power. Two indices developed
by Beyle (1998) are included in the analysis to measure the power of the governor to appoint offices and prepare the budget. 7 A dummy variable is also included to measure the impact of term limits on gubernatorial seats. States that impose limits on the amount of consecutive years in which the governor can serve are coded as term limit states while states without term limits are the excluded group. Palda (1992) provides evidence that gubernatorial power, when combined with government resources available, impacts campaign expenditures although individual measures of appointment, budget, and tenure power are insignificant.
Several variables are included to account for the conditions of the general election and the primary elections. A dummy variable is included to account for elections in which an incumbent is present. The presence of an incumbent in an election can have a drastic effect on the level of spending, given the advantages that incumbents enjoy over challengers. 8 Higher spending is expected in open seat elections because candidates lack the advantage of name recognition and support. A variable is also included to account for the number of candidates involved in the election. Candidates are expected to spend more when there are more challengers. It is also expected that closer races will involve higher levels of spending. Candidates will generally spend less if they perceive that they will win or lose by a large margin. This is measured with the post-election winning margin. 9 The three aforementioned variables are included for the general election, the Republican primary, and the Democratic primary.
Variables are also included to account for the lack of a challenger in both the Republican and Democratic primary elections. Candidates are expected to spend less when they do not have to compete in a primary election as 7 Beyle (1998) develops two scales in order to measure the governor's appointment power and the governor's budgetary power. Governor appointment power is measured by examining the governor's ability to appoint positions in public utilities, transportation, education, health, corrections, and welfare. The scale ranges from 0 when the legislature is able to select the position to 5 where the governor appoints the position without any approval (rounded to the nearest 0.5). Governor budgetary power is measured on a scale where 1 indicates that budget responsibilities are shared among elected officials and the legislature has an unlimited ability to change the budget and 5 indicates that the governor has full control of the budget and the legislature cannot alter the budget. Higher scores indicate a higher degree of power. The updated index is available online through the website listed in the references. 8 Incumbents enjoy recognition and status benefits over challengers, allowing them access to greater finances. Open seat candidates are also well financed as they have a greater chance to win than challengers. Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) and Moncrief (1998) show that incumbents and open seat candidates spend more in elections in comparison to challengers.
9 Previous research has found that greater degrees of competition are associated with higher campaign spending as donors are more willing to contribute in more competitive races (Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell, 1994) . Candidates generally have an idea of the closeness of the election and spend accordingly. This follows Muth's (1961) rational expectations and is used in Kirchgässner and Meyer Zu Himmern (1997) .
primary spending can contribute substantially to campaign expenditures . The percentage differences between the number of Republicans and Democrats in both the state senate and house are included. Previous research has found that the political composition of the chambers impacts legislative campaign expenditures (Stonecash, 1990; Hogan, 2000) .
Campaign finance laws for gubernatorial elections vary by state as well. In order to account for differences between state campaign finance laws, this analysis employs the campaign finance law coding used in Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose (2006) . The authors utilize three separate dummy variables to examine the existence of limitations on campaign contributions from organizations, limitations on campaign contributions from individuals, and the availability of public funding for candidates. 10 Previous research has found that campaign finance laws do not reduce the overall level of spending in gubernatorial elections (Bardwell, 2003) .
In order to examine the effect of the voter initiative on campaign spending, a dummy variable is included for voter initiative states. 11 A list of these states is provided in Additionally, other provisions that impact the ease of qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot and the ability of the state legislature to moderate the effects of a successful voter initiative campaign differ among the states. In order to further evaluate the effects of the voter initiative process, two other alternative measures of the voter initiative process are examined along with the voter initiative dummy variable. Bowler and Donovan (2004) introduce two indices to account for differences in voter initiative methods between states. The qualification difficulty index provides a rough measure of the complexity of qualifying a voter initiative proposal for the ballot.
The qualification difficulty index ranges from zero to six based on the necessary requirements to qualify a proposal for a ballot. The authors suggest that higher values indicate a more accessible voter initiative process as it may be easier to place a proposal on the ballot. The legislative insulation index provides a rough measure of the extent to which the state legislature can mitigate the effects of a successful voter initiative. The legislative insulation index ranges from zero to nine. The authors suggest that legislatures in states with higher values have a lesser ability to block the effects of a successful voter initiative. 14 Table 1 (Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith, 2001; Bowler and Donovan, 2004) .
Year dummy variables are included to account for time fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are employed at the state level as it is possible that interclass correlation may be an issue for gubernatorial expenditures within a state over time due to the panel nature of the data. Additionally, a second analysis includes regional dummy variables to account for any differences across regions in the U.S. 15 While there are states in each region of the U.S.
that have access to the voter initiative process, the majority of the voter initiative states are in the West. Matsusaka 14 Bowler and Donovan (2004) use the number of formal provisions required to place a voter initiative on the ballot in order to develop the qualification difficulty index. The number of provisions that restrict the ability of the legislature to alter the effects of a successful voter initiative is used to develop the legislative insulation index. Their indices have been reversed in this paper in order to simplify the interpretation of the indices. Bowler and Donovan (2004) Table 2 .
Regression Results and Discussion
The results for the analysis excluding regional dummy variables are presented in Table 3 . Island, 1990 . Bruce Sundland (in his third attempt at the governor seat) spent a great deal of money to defeat incumbent Edward DiPrete.
[ Table 3 ]
The results in column (a) of Table 3 indicate that spending in gubernatorial contests is approximately $0.48 lower in states in which the voter initiative process is available, significant at the five percent level. Additionally, the voter initiative variable is significant in column (b) at the ten percent level when the signature requirement is included in the analysis. The voter initiative variable in column (b) of Table 3 indicates that spending is reduced by $0.78 for states with the voter initiative. The signature requirement in column (b) is $0.04, although the coefficient is insignificant in the analysis. While we cannot confirm that spending in gubernatorial elections is reduced to a greater extent in voter initiative states with lower signature requirements, it does appear that the availability of the voter initiative process is associated with lower levels of campaign expenditures in gubernatorial contests.
Columns (c), (d), and (e) provide an analysis of the marginal impact of several differences in the voter
initiative process and usage on gubernatorial campaign expenditures. In order to interpret the results, the voter initiative dummy variable and the included measures of the voter initiative process can be viewed as interaction terms. All states that lack the voter initiative process receive a value of zero for these independent variables. In column (c), the coefficient for the qualification difficulty index has the expected negative sign but is insignificant.
We do not find evidence that spending is reduced as the number of formal provisions that must be satisfied to place a voter initiative on a ballot is reduced. However, a negative and significant value for the legislative insulation index is observed in column (d). The authors of the index suggest that the ability of the legislature to block the effects of a successful voter initiative campaign decrease as the index increases in this analysis. The coefficient of approximately negative $0.10 indicates that spending is reduced as the number of formal provisions that assist the state legislature in mitigating the impact of the voter initiative process declines. Column (e) of Table 3 The results in Table 4 duplicate the results from Table 3 [ Table 4 ]
Implications of the Voter Initiative Process
The results suggest that the availability of the voter initiative process weakens the relative political power of the executive branch. While the governor can employ or support the voter initiative process to accomplish goals in some cases, the voter initiative process can also lead to policies contrary to the preferences of the governor and avoid the governor's veto power. The significant negative coefficient on the voter initiative dummy variable implies that the sustained loss in power due to the voter initiative process seems to outweigh any benefits of the voter initiative process for the governor. Additionally, these results are consistent with a scenario in which constituents and other interested parties may choose to pursue some political goals through the voter initiative process as an alternative to supporting the governor. Rather than devoting resources to elect a specific gubernatorial candidate, interested parties in voter initiative states have the option to use the voter initiative process as a substitute method to accomplish their objectives. There are other notable findings regarding insignificant variables as well. Somewhat surprisingly, gubernatorial appointment power and gubernatorial budgetary power are insignificant in all specifications. However, previous research has found these powers insignificant alone but significant when interacted with state resources and considered jointly (Palda, 1992) . Additionally, campaign finance variables coded for the existence of limitations on individual campaign contributions, group campaign contributions, and public financing are insignificant in all specifications. Previous research suggests that campaign finance laws do not reduce the overall level of spending in gubernatorial contests, although campaign finance laws may reduce spending for incumbents relative to challengers (Bardwell, 2003) .
Other Variables of Interest

Complementary Strategy: The Voter Initiative Process and Federal Senate Elections
While the findings in this study provide evidence that the voter initiative process impacts gubernatorial spending, it is important to provide a note of caution in the interpretation of the results. Due to the difficulty in devising an empirical strategy that controls for all possible factors that impact gubernatorial spending, we cannot ignore the possibility that spurious correlation could drive the inverse relationship between the availability of the voter initiative process and gubernatorial campaign expenditures.
In order to examine the potential spurious correlation between the availability of the voter initiative process and campaign expenditures, an additional regression analysis was performed examining the impact of the 19 The results of this analysis are robust to any changes in the model employed. An analysis excluding the primary election independent variables was performed as an additional check. The primary results of the analysis persist. The results for the analysis of total election cycle Senate expenditures per capita are presented in Table 5 .
The coefficients on our voter initiative variables are positive and insignificant in specifications (a) through (e). The relationship between the availability of the voter initiative process and campaign expenditures does not persist in federal Senate elections. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility of spurious correlation, these results provide evidence against the notion. Additionally, winning margin and state population significantly impact per capita campaign expenditures in Senate elections.
[ Table 5 ]
Conclusion
While previous literature has examined the loss of political power sustained by the state legislature when the voter initiative process is available, this analysis provides evidence that the availability of the voter initiative process decreases the political power of the state governor. Additionally, the findings in this analysis suggest that 20 A number of the independent variables in the gubernatorial are either difficult or impossible to include in the Senate analysis. However, the results regarding the voter initiative variables are consistent regardless of the empirical specification.
-16 -constituents and interested parties may look to the voter initiative process as a substitute means to accomplish their political goals. Instead of providing campaign resources for a gubernatorial candidate, individuals in voter initiative states have the option to fund a voter initiative campaign.
While this study provides some insight into the relationship between the executive branch and the voter initiative process, further exploration of the topic is necessary to better understand the impact of the voter initiative process on the power of the governor and the circumstances under which the voter initiative process can help or harm the governor. Additionally, consistent with previous research, the results of this analysis imply that the voter initiative process is viewed as an important policy shaping tool by individuals and interested parties. Further research that allows us to better understand the individuals involved in the voter initiative process, the methods in which the voter initiative process is employed, and the potential benefits and drawbacks of the effects of the voter initiative process on policy outcomes seems a worthy endeavor.
Figure 1:
The Effect of the Voter Initiative on the Relative Power of the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Median Voter (Matsusaka, 2005) Note: The median voter's ideal policy preference (V), the legislature's ideal policy preferences (L), and the governor's ideal policy preference (G) are points along the real line where policy (x) is a point on the real line. c. The indices are developed in Bowler and Donovan (2004) . The qualification difficulty index ranges from 1 to 6 with the difficulty in qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot decreasing as the values increase. The legislative insulation index ranges from 1 to 9 with the insulation to the legislature decreasing as the values increase. States that lack the voter initiative process receive a value of 0. New Hampshire, 2002; West Virginia, 1980; South Dakota, 2002; and Rhode Island, 1990 ) are omitted. (New Hampshire, 2002; West Virginia, 1980; South Dakota, 2002; Rhode Island, 1990) . Standard errors are noted in parenthesis. There are 294 observations. Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. Year dummy variables are not reported. Clustered standard errors are employed. Adjusted R-squared is not reported for maximum likelihood estimation, but was approximately 0.405 for OLS estimation. 
